In Federal Trade Commission v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 17383 (2nd Cir. 2016), the Second Circuit recently held that an affiliate marketing network provider could be subjected to liability under the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”) for deceptive marketing materials published by the affiliates. It also concluded that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) did not immunize the network provider from liability. In doing so, the Second Circuit emphasized that the network provider had knowledge of and the authority to control the content of the affiliate websites. This ruling could increase the exposure of internet businesses to liability for deceptive acts or practices engaged in by third-party vendors or independent contractors.
In May, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in Spokeo v. Robins, providing guidance on the “injury-in-fact” aspect of the constitutional standing requirement for putative class action plaintiffs. 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016), as revised (May 24, 2016). Spokeo was quickly hailed by both plaintiff- and defense-side lawyers as a major victory, but in truth provided something for everyone. It requires, for example, that a plaintiff allege “a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation . . .” and not merely a “bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm.” Id. at 1543, 1549. Further, a “concrete” injury must “actually exist” and be “real, and not abstract.” Id. at 1548. On the other hand, a “concrete” injury is not “necessarily synonymous with ‘tangible.’” Id. at 1549. Ways to determine whether “intangible” harm qualifies as “concrete” include: (1) evaluating whether the alleged harm “has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit” and (2) looking to the judgment of Congress which “has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before.” Id.
If the New York State Department of Financial Services (“DFS”) has its way, come January 1, 2017, financial services companies that require a form of authorization to operate under the banking, insurance, or financial services laws (“Covered Entities”) will be required to comply with a new set of comprehensive cybersecurity regulations aimed at safeguarding information systems and nonpublic information.
Last week, researchers at Citizen Lab uncovered sophisticated new spyware that allowed hackers to take complete control of anyone’s iPhone, turning the phone into a pocket-spy to intercept communications, track movements and harvest personal data. The malicious software, codenamed “Pegasus,” is believed to have been developed by the NSO Group, an Israeli company (whose majority shareholder is a San Francisco based private equity firm) that describes itself as a “leader in cyber warfare” and sells its software — with a price tag of $1 million – primarily to foreign governments. The software apparently took advantage of three previously unknown security flaws in Apple’s iOS software, and was described by experts as “the most sophisticated” ever seen on the market. Apple quickly released a patch of its software, iOS 9.3.5, and urged users to download it immediately.
The Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) recent $1 million settlement with Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC (“MSSB”) marked a turning point in the agency’s focus on cybersecurity issues, an area that the agency has proclaimed a top enforcement priority in recent years. The MSSB settlement addressed various cybersecurity deficiencies that led to the misappropriation of sensitive data for approximately 730,000 customer accounts.
1. Illinois and Texas recently enacted laws regulating the collection and use of biometric information (e., information based on an individual’s biometric identifiers, such as iris scans, fingerprints, voiceprints, or facial geometry) and a number of other states, including New York and California, are considering adopting such statutes. The Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”) permits private rights of action and provides for statutory damages ranging from $1,000 to $5,000 per violation. The Texas analog, entitled Capture or Use of Biometric Identifier (“CUBI”), is enforceable only by the state attorney general and permits civil penalties up to $25,000 per violation.
Earlier this week, the FTC and FCC announced “parallel” investigations into how carriers and mobile device makers release information on vulnerabilities, and how and when mobile security patches are distributed. The regulators, who have publicly jockeyed for position on privacy and cybersecurity matters in the past year, appear to have reached a truce of sorts, allowing each agency to examine industry players within its core jurisdiction.
In a news conference today President Obama addressed rules and proposed regulations announced Thursday intended to help the U.S. fight tax evasion and other crimes connected to anonymous offshore companies and accounts. The announcements come after a month of intense review by the administration following the first release of the so-called Panama Papers, millions of documents stolen or leaked from Panamanian law firm Mossack, Fonseca. The papers have revealed a who’s who of international politicians, business leaders, sports figures and celebrities involved with financial transactions accomplished through anonymous shell corporations.
On April 6, 2016, National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) issued a federal notice to request public comment on the benefits, challenges, and potential roles for the government in fostering the advancement of the Internet of Things (IoT). (RFC at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/fr_rfc_iot_04062016.pdf).
Comments are due on May 23, 2016.
In Campbell-Ewald v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663 (Jan. 20, 2016), the Supreme Court resolved a split among courts and held that an unaccepted settlement offer of complete individual relief does not moot the plaintiff’s lawsuit. However, the Court expressly left open the question of “whether the result would be different if a defendant deposits the full amount of the plaintiff’s individual claim in an account payable to the plaintiff, and then the court enters judgment for the plaintiff in that amount.” 136 S. Ct. at 672. Continue Reading